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"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."
-Albert Einstein1

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE INTERACTION OF GENDER BIAS AND
WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT

A number of frameworks can help us think about work/family conflict.
In the short space I have here, I will focus on framing the problem of
work/family conflict as a form of sex discrimination. This may seem
obvious, given that conflicts between work and family take their greatest toll
on women and gender-nonconforming men.2
Yet in employment
discrimination disputes, legal scholarship, and political discourse more
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah. Many thanks to Kathy Baker, Richard
Block, Martha Ertman, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Janelle Shubert, Peggie Smith, and Matthew
Weinstein for their helpful comments; to the Pepperdine Law Review for inviting me to participate
in this symposium; to Kathy Abrams, Martha Fineman, Vicki Schultz, Susan Sturm, Virginia Valian,
and Joan Williams for their foundational theoretical contributions to this work; and to the S. J.
Quinney College of Law summer research program for financial support. All rights reserved
December 15, 2006.
1. This quote, or something to similar effect, is widely attributed to Albert Einstein. See N.
DAVID MERMIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME: UNDERSTANDING EINSTEIN'S RELATIVITY xiv (2005).
2. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT 3 (2000); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,

Women's Cultural Caregiving,and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 371, 386-89 (2001); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and ParentalLeave, 72 TEX. L. REV.

1047 passim (1994).

generally, it is actually an open question whether work/family conflict is a
discrimination problem, at least one for which employers should be held
responsible. Therefore, it is important when having a conversation about the
topic of work/family conflict to get back to basics. Toward that end, I will
focus on demonstrating that many of the theories commonly used to
illustrate an absence of employment discrimination in the context of
work/family conflict actually fit quite nicely within the discrimination box.
The other thing I wish to do here is to contextualize the problem of
work/family conflict within the larger issue of gender bias in the workplace.
In many academic conversations about sex-discrimination in the workplace,
gender bias and work/family conflict are conceptualized as separate
problems.
According to this approach, each has distinct causes,

constituencies, and (sometimes conflicting) solutions.3

With a few

exceptions, 4 gender bias in these conversations is constructed as a type of

stereotyping thatpeople do, whereas work/family conflict is largely regarded
as a form of structural discrimination arising from the organization of work
itself. However, recent and more sophisticated research on employment
discrimination has shown that what formerly was understood as "first
generation" animus or stereotyping claims are often a function of
unconscious behavior, subtle interactions among workers, and workplace
structures that reinforce discriminatory behavior by individual actors.5 At
the same time, other research has shown how work/family conflict may
interact with, and actually amplify, gender bias at work.6 Thus, as we gain a
better understanding from social scientists about how discrimination actually
works, the separation of gender bias and work/family conflict into separate
categories becomes increasingly inadequate when trying to analyze and
ameliorate inequality in the workplace.
With this in mind, this symposium contribution moves beyond the
specific issue of work/family conflict and discusses gender discrimination
within the workplace more generally, describing how each contributes to and
works together to produce inequality for women in the workplace. Because
I have just completed a study of family leave policies and practices in
American law schools, 7 I will illustrate my points in this essay with

3. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Carefor Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1753 (2001); Kessler, supra note 2; Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994); Vicki
Schultz, Essay, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
4. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2; Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001).
5. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465-74 (2001).
6. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are DiscriminatedAgainst on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 90-102 (2003).
7. Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings and Open
Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661 (2006).
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examples from law school workplaces, but they apply equally to other
professional settings.
The most striking thing about legal academia is the existence of a glass

ceiling for women law professors. If one looks at the top of the legal
academy, it is nothing like 50-50. It looks nothing like the beginning of the
pipeline, despite the fact that women have been graduating from law schools

in equal proportion to men for some time. 8 For example, in 2005, just 19%
of law school deans were women. 9 As one goes down the pyramid, one can
see the classic glass ceiling pattern: women constitute 25% of tenured full

professors,' 0 45% of associate professors," and 46% of assistant tenured or

tenure-track professors.12 This glass ceiling pattern is most striking at the
most highly ranked law schools, which exhibit an even steeper pyramid. 13

In addition, job segregation by sex is pervasive in law schools. Women
14
disproportionately hold lower-status, lower-paying, non-tenure-track jobs.
There truly is a pink ghetto' 5 inside law schools, and it reaches well beyond

8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WHITE, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS STATISTICAL
REPORT ON LAW SCHOOL FACULTY AND CANDIDATES FOR LAW FACULTY POSITIONS 36 tbl.5A
(2005), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/statistics/Reporttables-0405.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education:A Statistical Update, 73 UMKC
L. REV. 419 (2004). Specifically, in 2003-04, all but two of the thirteen highly-ranked "producer"
law schools fell below the national percentage of female tenured and tenure-track faculty, which was
28.3% in 2003-04. Id. at 439 tbl.12. Eight fell substantially below the national percentage, with
women tenured and tenure-track professors making up just 16% to 21% of their faculties. Id. Five
of the thirteen producer schools identified had the same or smaller percentage of female tenured and
tenure-track faculty in 2003-04 than they did in 1996-99. Id. at 439-40. The thirteen producer law
schools and their corresponding female faculty percentages in 2003-04 were: NYU (33%),
Georgetown (32%), Stanford (28%), Chicago (27%), Michigan (25%), Columbia (21%), Yale
(20%), Virginia (20%), Duke (20%), Northwestern (20%), Harvard (19%), Berkeley (19%), and
Pennsylvania (16%). Id. at 439 tbl. 12.
14. See WHITE, supra note 8, at 3 tbl.IA. In 2004-05, women comprised approximately twothirds of contract assistant (65.3%) and associate professors (62.2%), lecturers and instructors
(66.3%), and assistant deans without the title professor (68.3%). Id. These figures have remained
consistent for over a decade. Id. at 41-47 tbl.6C. For example, the percentage of women lecturers
and instructors has hovered around 65-70% for fourteen years. Id. Along the same lines, in 2005,
women comprised nearly two-thirds or more of all academic law librarians, except for library
directors or computer librarians. See AM. ASS'N OF LAW LIBRARIES, THE AALL BIENNIAL SALARY
SURVEY & ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS (2005) (showing that 67.9% of assistant library
directors, 65.3% of supervisory librarians, 76.3% of acquisitions librarians, 67.9% of catalog
librarians, 75% of circulation/interlibrary loan librarians, and 60.9% of reference librarians were
women (calculated from statistical tables S-37, S-39, S-44, S-45, S-48, S-50)). Id. Along the same
lines, 50.6% of law library directors, 41.7% of computer librarians, and 24.1% of computer
technicians were women. Id. (calculated from statistical tables S-35, S-41, S-57).
15. The term "pink ghetto" is used to describe low-wage, low-status jobs traditionally filled by
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the secretaries.

in law

firms,' 7

16

There is nothing unique about these patterns. We see them

in medicine,' 8 and in business.' 9 What explains them?

women.
16. See Marina Angel, The Glass Ceilingfor Women in Legal Education: ContractPositions and
the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1-15 (2000); Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in
the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 575-76 (2000); Nancy
Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domesticationof FemaleAcademics,
49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 778-79 (2001); Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst: Law
Schools' Potential Liability for Employment Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1-12 (2005);
Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools' Dirty Little Secrets,
16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 3 passim (2001).
17. See AM. BAR ASS'N, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2001) (discussing studies on the secondary status of women in the legal
profession); AM. BAR ASS'N, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2006)
(finding that women of color are leaving law firms in droves because of discrimination); KATHARINE
T. BARTLETT, ANGELA P. HARRIS & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW 198-99 (2002)
(summarizing research on the glass ceiling in business and law); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, DIVERSITY INLAW FIRMS 5 (2003), availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
reports/diversitylaw/lawfirms.pdf (citing evidence demonstrating that women have "fared poorly" in
the "up and out" system of large national law firms); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings
and Open Doors: Women 's Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 302303 (1995) (finding that women's progress in law firms fell far short of those of men); Wynn R.
Huang, Gender Differences in the Earningsof Lawyers, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 267, 268-69
(1997) (finding that female lawyers are less likely to obtain partnership status, receive significantly
smaller income premiums when they do become partners, are more likely than men to be financially
penalized for taking time out of the labor force, and suffer gender-based wage discrimination that
cannot be attributed to human capital factors); Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Assimilation,
Choice, or Constraint? Testing Theories of Gender Differences in the Careers of Lawyers, 79 Soc.
FORCES 229, 229, 250-53 (2000) (finding that women's overrepresentation in less prestigious and
less remunerative settings and their underrepresentation in law firm partnerships is not fully
explained by individual choices or differences in human capital).
18. See VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 208-09 (1998)
(reviewing data showing that women are underrepresented in the most prestigious medical fields and
that over time, women physician's salaries lag behind those of men); Arlene S. Ash et al.,
Compensation and Advancement of Women in Academic Medicine: Is There Equity?, 141 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 205, 209 (2004) (finding that women in academic medicine have not reached senior
academic ranks in proportion to their representation in medical school faculties and that they are
significantly less likely to be full professors than comparably credentialed men); Sherrie H. Kaplan
et al., Sex Differences in Academic Achievement, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1283 (1996) (finding
that at every rank, except that of instructor, there were proportionately more men than women in
academic pediatric departments, that this disparity was most pronounced in the senior ranks, and that
women were less likely to work in elite subspecialties); Lynn Nonnemaker, Women Physicians in
Academic Medicine, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 402, 404 (2000) (finding that the proportion of
women who advanced to the senior ranks of academic medicine was lower than that of their male
colleagues and that women were overrepresented in specialties such as pediatrics).
19. See BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 198 (summarizing research on the glass ceiling in
business); CATALYST, 2005 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND TOP
EARNERS OF THE FORTUNE 500, at 17, 36 fig. 14 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 CATALYST CENSUS]
(documenting occupational segregation and the glass ceiling for women in business); CATALYST,
WOMEN IN BUSINESS: A SNAPSHOT 1 (2004) (reporting that "[w]omen fill only 9.9% of the total line
positions held by corporate officers compared to men who fill 90.1%"), available at
http://www.catalyst.org/files/fact/Snapshot%202004.pdf; VALIAN, supra note 18, at 194-95 (finding
that although the evidence is not "clear cut," women with master's degrees in business
administration tend to be employed in staff (non-policy) positions in lower-paying sectors);
Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, The Gender Gap in Top CorporateJobs, 55 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 3, 17-18 (2001) (finding that women top executives are more common at small rather than

316

[Vol. 34: 313, 2007]

DiscriminationTheory
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

First, a voluminous body of social science research demonstrates that
unlawful gender discrimination persists inside the workplace. Although
there is no question that old-fashioned overt hostility toward women
employees still exists, 20 much o
of this contemporary discrimination is quite
subtle. As Susan Sturm explains, "The glass ceiling remains a barrier for
women and people of color largely because of patterns of interaction,
informal norms, networking, training, mentoring, and evaluation, as well as
the absence of systematic efforts to address bias produced by these
22
patterns., 2 1 Studies demonstrate that this type of "second generation"
discrimination exists across various types of workplaces and professions. 3
Given my limited space here, I will provide some examples from legal and
medical academia.
Women law faculty are less likely than their male colleagues to enjoy a
presumption of competence, 4 may receive fewer opportunities for
mentoring, 252 are disproportionately burdened2 7with service obligations, 6 and
often experience subtle "micro-aggressions.
In all of these areas, women

large firms); Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and
Continued Barriersto theirAdvancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006) ("[W]omen account for
nearly half of the labor force, but only about thirteen percent of available board seats at Fortune 500
corporations .... despite the fact that women have accounted for an increasingly larger portion of the
workforce for decades.").
20. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) ("There were 'so
many' incidents, it was difficult for her to recount them all."); Michael L. Selmi, Sex Discrimination
in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservationof Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 30 (2005).

21. See Sturm, supra note 5, at 469.
22. Id.at 458.
23. See VALIAN, supra note 18, at 126-44, 187-216.
24. See Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 344 (1996) (describing a student's request that a grade given by his
female professor be reviewed by a male colleague, and the colleague's acquiescence without
consulting the female professor). Along the same lines, on the first day of my civil procedure class,
a first-year student once raised his hand and said, "This isn't the way we are supposed to be leaming
law."
25. See Catharine Pierce Wells, The Perils of Race and Gender in a World of Legal Abstraction,
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 523, 528 (2000) (describing the professional isolation of women and minority law
professors).
26. See Susan B. Apel, Gender and Invisible Work: Musings of a Woman Law Professor, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 993, 997-1006 (1997); Celia Wells, Women Law Professors-Negotiating and
Transcending Gender Identities at Work, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-18 (2002); cf Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Tenure, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 passim (2003) (discussing the
disproportionate service obligations placed on untenured faculty of color).
27. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patternsof Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 687 (1985) (coining the term "micro-aggression"); see also Wells, supra
note 25, at 528-30 (2000) (describing a student organization event meant to parody a studentsponsored symposium on women's rights).

of color suffer the worst disadvantages.28

Women faculty members in

medicine also report a poorer quality of mentorship, less adequate
institutional support for their research, and less overall career satisfaction
than their male counterparts.29

Although work/family conflict is often conceptualized as a distinct
problem from these types of gender bias, being pregnant, taking a family
leave, or simply having children tends to amplify these "built-in
headwinds." 3 ° They do so in two ways: First, parenthood makes an
31
employee's gender more salient in the workplace, especially women's.
32

Second, it can trigger an independent set of caregiver stereotypes.
A description of a recent study of the "motherhood penalty" authored by
sociologists Shelley Correll and Stephen Benard at Cornell University helps
to illustrate this phenomenon.33 Correll and Benard sought to address one of
the significant limitations of earlier studies on the wage penalty for

mothers. 3 4 Survey research finds that mothers suffer a substantial per-child
wage penalty that is not explained by human capital or occupational

factors.35 Despite clear documentation of this pattern, the cause remains
uncertain, because existing research has not been able to definitively

distinguish between productivity and discrimination explanations for the
motherhood wage penalty. 36
Correll and Benard designed a study enabling them to control for
productivity.
They conducted a laboratory experiment in which
participants evaluated application materials for a pair of same race, same
gender job applicants who were equally qualified but differed only on

28. See Deborah L. Rhode, Midcourse Corrections: Women in Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 475, 482 (2003). It should not be surprising, therefore, that women of color do significantly
worse than non-minority women on virtually all of the AALS measures of status. See WHITE, supra
note 8.
29. See Kaplan et al., supra note 18, at 1287.
30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849, 854 (1971).
31. See Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 90-102.
32. Id.
33. Shelley J. Correll & Stephen Benard, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, AM. J.
Soc. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/athena/course/other/
econsocseminar/www/Getting%20A%20Job.doc).
34. See id. (manuscript at 3-5).
35. See Deborah J.Anderson, Melissa Binder & Kate Krause, The Motherhood Wage Penalty
Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUST. &
LAB. REL. REV. 273, 273-76 (2003) (finding a wage penalty for motherhood of approximately five
percent for one child and seven percent for two or more children); Michelle J. Budig & Paula
England, The Wage Penaltyfor Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204, 219-20 (2001) (finding a wage
penalty for motherhood of approximately seven percent per child).
36. Cf.Anderson, Binder & Krause, supra note 35, at 290-92 (indirectly ruling out productivity
explanations for the motherhood wage penalty from their unexpected finding that college-educated
mothers, whose jobs likely required significantly more effort than less educated women's jobs,
suffered a lower wage penalty than mothers with only a high-school degree).
37. Correll & Benard, supra note 33, at 4-5.
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parental status. 38 The results were striking: Mothers were rated as less
competent; less committed; less suitable for hire, promotion, and
management training; and deserving of lower salaries. 39 In a series of
hypothetical questions about the applicant, mothers were also held to higher
performance and punctuality standards.40 Men were not penalized for being
parents. 42In fact, they appeared to benefit from having children on some
measures.
The discrimination suggested by Correll and Benard's findings might be
rational from an economic standpoint if mothers, on average, are more costly
to employ because they are less productive or take more time off from work
than non-mothers. However, this theory is contested in the social science
literature.43 Moreover, even if rational, such discrimination would be
illegal. 44 Accordingly, the Correll and Benard study strongly suggests the
existence of illegal sex discrimination. Like the subtle processes described
in Susan Sturm's research 45 discussed earlier, the discrimination observed in
this study was likely not the product of conscious animus toward mothers.
Indeed, research shows that most people exhibit a combination of positive
and negative attitudes about working mothers, leading to complex patterns
of "benevolent" discrimination involving both helping behaviors and passive
harm such as social exclusion.46 There is a robust debate as to whether
employers should be held responsible for the subtle types of employment
discrimination discussed in this section. I briefly review this debate in the
next two parts.

38. Id. at 14-22.
39. Id. at 22-23.
40. Id. at 23.
41. Id.
42. Id. Correll & Benard's findings are corroborated by other studies. See, e.g., Amy J. C.
Cuddy et al., When ProfessionalBecome Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES
701, 711 (2004); Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and
ParentalStatus Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 737, 748 (2004).
43. Compare Gary S. Becker, Human Capital,Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor,3 J. LAB.
ECON. 33, 55 (1985), with Anderson, Binder & Krause, supra note 35 and Budig & England, supra
note 35.
44. See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) ("Even
a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom
the generalization does not apply.").
45. See Sturm, supra note 5, passim.
46. See Cuddy et al., supra note 42, at 703-04, 705-06 (summarizing research finding that
homemakers and mothers are often stereotyped as warm but incompetent and that they are often
liked but disrespected); Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 95 (reviewing studies on benevolent
stereotyping).

II.

ACCIDENTS, OPT-OUTS, AND OTHER NON-STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS

Citing a host of factors allegedly outside the control of employers,
scholars and the popular media have tended to downplay the role of
discrimination in workplace inequality. For example, law professor Amy
Wax has compared
second generation employment discrimination to an
"accident., 47 She suggests that if subtle bias operates at an unconscious
level, attaching liability to it will "do little to advance the cause of fair and
accurate compensation for victims. ' 48 This is because fact-finders will be
prone to error in assessing its actual incidence, and because employers will
not be able to internalize liability if they cannot control it. 4 9 One conclusion
we could reach from the accident analogy is that an insurance system should
be instituted to compensate victims of employment discrimination-perhaps
a government system, as in the case of a mass disaster ° or a public/private
system like worker's compensation and unemployment insurance. 51 But
Wax endorses no such proposal, because such an insurance system could
never be sufficiently accurate in her view.52 In its absence, we are left with
the simpler idea of "accident" as an employee's personal tragedy, for which
employers can not fairly be held responsible.
The idea that women are autonomous, unsituated actors fully
responsible for their secondary position in the workforce has also received a
great deal of recent attention in the media. Lisa Belkin reported in the New
York Times Magazine in 2003 that highly educated women are part of an
"Opt-Out Revolution": 53 "Why don't women run the world? . . . [B]ecause
they don't want to."'5 4 According to the article, women's relative absence in
senior positions in corporations and law firms is explained by their
preferences for motherhood and homemaking.55 Similarly, in late 2005, a
front-page New York Times story reported that sixty percent of female
students at Yale planned to retreat from promising careers and become stayat-home mothers once they had children.56 Even former Harvard University

47. See Amy L. Wax, Discriminationas Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1145 (1999).
48. Id. at 1134.
49. Id. at 1130-34.
50. See Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and "Natural" DisasterRelief: Narrating the
American Welfare State, 33 LAW & SOc'y REV. 257 passim (1999).
51. It may be argued that employment discrimination law is moving in that direction anyway,
notwithstanding Wax's opposition to an insurance system. See Desert Palace, Inc. v Costa, 539 U.S.
90, 99-100 (2003) (making the "mixed-motive" theory of discrimination available in all Title VII
cases, which in practice makes it easier to prove discrimination while potentially severely limiting
damages).
52. See Wax, supra note 47, at 1206-25.

53. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
54. Id.at 45.
55. Id.
56. See Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path to Motherhood, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al.
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President Lawrence Summers suggested last year that women prefer
motherhood over the demands of "high-powered intense work., 5 7 These
popular depictions of women construct the glass ceiling and pink ghetto as
the product of women's personal choices.
To be sure, it could be that some very privileged women have enough
economic clout to fashion a more balanced work and family life. However,
national labor force data suggest we should be skeptical about claims of a
revolution. 8 Approximately two-thirds of married mothers and threequarters of unmarried mothers with children under eighteen years old
participate in the labor force.59 Both parents were employed in almost twothirds of married-couple families with children in 2005.60 And the average
"off ramp" for professional women who become mothers is approximately
one year or less; for a significant portion, it is just a few months. 1 In sum,
there is no "opt-out revolution," not even a mini one.
At the same time, one cannot deny that there is a labor force attachment
gap between women and men, at least for short periods of time during peak
childbearing years and especially for women with young children. In 2005,
while 95.4% of men with children less than six years old participated in the
labor force, just 62.8% of such women did. 62 Moreover, labor force
participation rates merely indicate whether individuals are working. 63 They
do not reveal the quality or extent of labor force participation, for example,
whether it is full-time, part-time, permanent, or temporary. 64 If we look
more closely at the quality of women's employment, the existence of an
attachment gap is further confirmed. 65 For example, in 2005, 25.2% of
women worked part-time, compared with just 10.7% of men.66 In addition,

57. See Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science &
Engineering Workforce, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/20O5/nber.html.

58.
(April
59.
60.

See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Characteristics of Families in 2005
27, 2006), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf [hereinafter Press Release].
Id.
Id.

61. See Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce, Off-Ramps and On-Ramps: Keeping Talented
Women on the Road to Success, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar. 2005, at 46; Julia Overturf Johnson &
Barbara Downs, Maternity Leave and Employment Patterns of First-Time Mothers: 1961-2000,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REP., P70-103, at 17

(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-103.pdf (reporting that more than
sixty-five percent of women now return to work within a year of having babies and work later into
their pregnancies, often until the last month).
62. See Press Release, supranote 58, at tbl.5.
63. Howard V. Hayghe & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Married Mothers' Work Patterns: The JobFamily Compromise, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1994, at 24.
64. Id.
65. See Kessler, supra note 2, at 384-86,
66. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WOMEN AND MEN

approximately seventy percent of part-time workers and sixty percent of
temporary agency workers are women.67

Do these concessions support the opt-out theory for women who do no
wage work, work part-time, work in pink-collar jobs, or who do not advance
to the top of traditionally male professions?
If one starts with the
assumption that individuals make decisions unaffected by the larger
structures and institutions in society-for example, the family, the
workplace, and the state-then perhaps one could conclude that women
choose to serve as secondary workers. On the other hand, if one takes
account of the significant research and theorizing on structural
discrimination, then the accident and opt-out stories are much too simple.
III.

STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS

What we need is an approach recognizing the role of structural forces in
producing workplace inequality. This section examines some of those
forces, including workplace culture and discrimination, gender socialization
within the educational system and families, wage discrimination within the
labor market, employment discrimination law, welfare law, and tax law.
First, gender bias inside workplaces helps to explain women's apparent
preference for lower-status, lower-paying jobs. 68 Women, like men, are
influenced by the expectations of those around them, leading them to
perform in ways that meet those expectations. 69 As Vicki Schultz explains,
"[P]eople's work aspirations are shaped by their experiences in the work
world . .

.

.[S]tructural features of work organizations reduce women's

incentive to pursue nontraditional work and encourage them to display the
very work attitudes and behaviors that come to be viewed as preexisting
gender attributes."7 ° These observations are supported by a significant body
of social science research, from classic studies such as Rosabeth Moss
Kanter's Men and Women of the Corporation,7' to recent research on the

downsizing of women's ambition, which shows that professional women
IN2005, http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qf-ESWM05.htm (Oct. 14, 2006).

67. See U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKERS: INCOMES AND BENEFITS

REST OF WORKFORCE 46 app. II (June 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00076.pdf.
68. See Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A
Response to ProfessorEpstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1992) (noting the importance of"a
complex, variable pattern of interaction between ... biological variables and other institutional or
attitudinal influences"); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815-39 (1990).
69. See VALIAN, supra note 18, at 145-86 (summarizing research on women's internalization of
low expectations).
70. See Schultz, supra note 68, at 1824-25.
71. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 3 (1977) (finding that
the social and structural aspects of work organization affect how people behave inside organizations;
"[T]he job makes the person.")
LAG
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often exit high-profile jobs not because the work was too demanding, but
because their accomplishments have not been appropriately recognized.72
Indeed, gender negatively impacts men and women's career ambitions
long before they ever obtain their first "real" job. For example, as early as
high school, and most clearly in college, young men and women choose
courses and majors that differentiate along gender lines.73 Parents' and
educators' gendered expectations and assessments of children's abilities play
an important role in this process. 7 " Although contested in traditional
economic accounts of women's labor market behavior, these studies simply
affirm a foundational insight of sociology that culture-including the culture
of gender-influences what individuals deem possible or appropriate. 5
Wage discrimination in the labor market also inevitably leads women to
marginalize their wage labor, especially women in dual-earner, heterosexual
couple households. In study after study, human capital explanations simply
do not explain the entire differential in pay between women and men in the
same jobs.76 That some relatively privileged women may decide, in the face
of this persistent wage discrimination, to reduce their human capital
investments in work should come as no surprise.77 In sum, research shows
that persistent patterns of discrimination in the workplace, educational
system, and inside families lead to the very marginalization that is

72.

See ANNA FELS, NECESSARY DREAMS: AMBITION IN WOMEN'S CHANGING LIVES 211-12

(2004).
73. See, e.g., Shelley J. Correll, Constraints into Preferences: Gender, Status, and Emerging
CareerAspirations, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 93, 110-11 (2004) (finding that cultural beliefs about gender
constrain the career aspirations of women college students); Shelley J. Correll, Gender and the
Career Choice Process: The Role ofBiased Self-Assessments, 106 AM. J. Soc. 1691, 1723-24 (2001)
(finding that male high school students rated their own mathematical ability higher than female
students did with the same grades and test scores in mathematics, and that this inflated selfassessment significantly contributed to males' greater enrollment in a high school calculus course
and their decisions to major in science, math, or engineering in college).
74. See Jacquelynne S. Eccles, Understanding Women 's Educationaland OccupationalChoices:
Applying the Eccles et al. Model of Achievement-Related Choices, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 585,
604 (1994) (showing that gender role stereotypes, among other cultural factors, influences parents'
expectations of their children's abilities, which ultimately influences children's self perceptions and
their decision regarding college course selection).
75. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 175
(Richard Nice trans., 1984) (describing how social class frames or constrains preferences and
choices).
76. See BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 163-65 (2002) (summarizing studies on the gender
wage gap among lawyers); VALIAN, supra note 18, at 194-97, 203-06, 208, 220-25 (reviewing
studies finding a gender wage gap in business, law, medicine, and academia which cannot fully be
explained by human capital or specialty differences); Huang, supra note 17, at 310 (finding that
female lawyers suffer gender-based wage discrimination that cannot be attributed to human capital
factors); Women at Work: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2003, at 49 tbl.8 (reporting
that "women continue to earn less than men in every major age group").
77. See Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?,25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 16-17 (2002).
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commonly attributed to women's personal choices.
If we just stopped here, it would be hard to accept the accident and optout explanations for the glass ceiling, job segregation, and attachment gap.
But there is more. Women make decisions about wage work within the
context of our country's inadequate employment discrimination laws and
family leave policies. 78 Title VII has prohibited employment discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy since 1978,79 when Congress passed the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"). 80 However, courts deciding Title
VII cases have generally refused to interpret the law to cover employee's
caregiving responsibilities beyond the immediate, physical events of
pregnancy and childbirth. 8' For example, courts have uniformly held that
women whose employers terminate, demote, or otherwise discipline them
because of their need for time off to breastfeed, provide medical care to,
adopt, or simply care for a newborn child are not protected by the PDA. 2
Perhaps this is the correct interpretation, at least with regard to requests for
time off to care for a child. After all, the PDA only covers "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions., 83 However, one can make a
colorable argument that breastfeeding is a medical condition related to
pregnancy, especially when one considers that the Supreme Court has read
other discrimination theories into Title VII without a clear textual basis in
the law, such as disparate impact 84 and hostile work environment sexual
harassment. 85

Along the same lines, courts have refused to interpret discrimination on
the basis of sex "plus" an employee's need to adjust her work schedule to
care for a child as unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII's "sex-plus"
theory.86 And courts have rejected disparate impact claims challenging a
host of policies that disproportionately and negatively affect women
workers, including long work hours, rigid work schedules, limited personal
leave, strict limits on absenteeism, prolonged probation or evaluation
periods, frequent or extended travel requirements, and the second-class
treatment of part-time workers.8 7 The passage of the Family and Medical

78. See Kessler, supranote 2.
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (2000).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (amending Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination
as a prohibited form of sex discrimination).
81. See Kessler, supra note 2, at 391-419.
82. Id. at 394-400.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
84. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
85. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
86. See Kessler, supra note 2, at 400-12. Under the sex-plus theory, employers may not treat
female employees differently than their male coworkers on the basis of their sex "plus" some
facially neutral characteristic. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
87. See Kessler, supra note 2, at 413-14.
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Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA") 88 seemed to alter this state of affairs.
However, a close examination of the FMLA reveals that it does little more
than provide job security to some employees in the case of childbirth.8 9 In
sum, neither Title VII nor the FMLA, which constitute the bulk of the

United States' maternity and parental leave policies, provides for the most
common employment leave needs of caregivers, who by all measures are
disproportionately women. 90
Thanks to the herculean efforts of feminist theorists and lawyers such as

Joan Williams and her Center for WorkLife Law, there has been recent
progress in the courts for caregivers who experience "maternal wall" 9'
discrimination at work. 92 This is very promising. Given our country's
present strong political commitment to neoliberalism, an incremental

88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). The FMLA requires covered employers to provide up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave during a twelve-month period to any eligible employee who needs the
time off (1) for a serious health condition of the employee that prevents him/her from performing the
essential functions of his/her job; (2) to care for the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent
where that family member has a serious health condition; (3) for the birth of a child of the employee,
in order to care for the child; and (4) for the placement of an adopted or foster child with the
employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
89. See Kessler, supra note 2, at 419-26.
90. See Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender
Division of Household Labor, 79 Soc. FORCES 191, 196 (2000) (reviewing sociological literature
over the past twenty years which show that women invest significantly more hours in household
labor than do men despite some narrowing of gender differences in recent years); Scott Coltrane,
Research on Household Labor: Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine
Family Work, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1208 (2000) (reviewing more than 200 scholarly articles and
books on household labor showing that women still do at least twice as much housework as men);
Laura Sanchez & Elizabeth Thomson, Becoming Mothers and Fathers:Parenthood,Gender, and the
Division of Labor, Il GENDER & Soc'Y 747, 765 tbl.4 (1997) (showing that when housework,
childcare, and wage work are all considered, women with young children work twenty more hours a
week than men on average); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1996) (reviewing sociological studies showing that, by all measures,
women perform substantially more housework than men, regardless of their employment status);
Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 520 n.18, 522 n.21 (1998) (collecting sociological studies showing
that the work-leisure gap always favors the husband).
91. According to Williams, two key features of maternal wall discrimination are unthinking
stereotypes about working mothers and the organization of market work around the ideal of a worker
who works full-time and overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing and childrearing.
See Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to Gender
Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. I passim (2003).
92. See Mary C. Still, Litigating the Maternal Wall: U.S. Lawsuits Charging Discrimination
Against Workers with Family Responsibilities (Center for WorkLife Law), July 6, 2006, at 2,
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site-files/WLL/FRDreport.pdf (reporting that in the last
decade the number of "family responsibilities discrimination" cases filed grew nearly 400% and that
plaintiffs are more likely to win these lawsuits than other types of employment discrimination cases);
see also Williams & Segal, supra note 6, at 121-61.
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litigation strategy may be the most realistic way of making the structure of
work more compatible with family responsibilities.
At the same time, as Richard Block's presentation at this symposium
illustrates, presently the United States falls behind Canada and every
European country in the statutory provision of paid family leave. 93 This lack
of pay during family leave discourages some workers from taking family
leave, pressures other workers to cut their leaves short, and reduces men's
use of family leave. For example, a national study of family leave use
commissioned by the Department of Labor found that only about one-fifth of
eligible employees covered by the FMLA even take family leave because it
is unpaid, and few take leave for more than a couple of weeks. 94 Of those
employees who need family or medical leave and do not take it, more than
three-quarters cite being unable to afford it as the primary reason. 95
Moreover, because men still generally earn more than women, unpaid leave
entitlements such as the FMLA do not provide a sufficient incentive for men
in dual-earner, heterosexual couple households to take family leave. 96 The
relatively short twelve-week maximum duration of family leave in the
United States also has negative effects. For example, some employees may
leave their jobs in favor of a longer family leave and then return to an
alternative job, often at a lower status or salary.
Family leave is only one element that provides the context in which
caregivers make career decisions. Unlike other Western industrialized
countries, mandatory overtime is largely unregulated in the United States
and few provisions exist
for flexible work arrangements or the right to a
"good" part-time job. 97 Publicly supported child care in the United States is
provided only to the poorest families and the demand far exceeds the
supply. 98 Our income tax system favors single earner couples who conform
93. See Richard N. Block, Work-Family Legislation in the United States, Canada, and Western
Europe: A Quantitative Comparison, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 333; see also JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA
K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT
319 tbl.C.2 (2003); INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LEAVE POLICIES AND RELATED RESEARCH 2006, at

54
tbl. 1
(Peter
Moss
&
Margaret
O'Brien
eds.,
2006),
available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31948.pdf; Erin L. Kelly, Work-Family Policies: The UnitedStates in
International Perspective, in THE WORK AND FAMILY HANDBOOK 99, 103 tbl.5.1 (Marcie PittCatsouphes, Ellen Ernst Kossek & Stephen Sweet eds., 2006); Jane Waldfogel, International
Policies Toward Parental Leave and Child Care, II FUTURE OF CHILDREN 99 (2001). Some
relatively elite, professional employers are an exception. See Kessler, supra note 7. For example,
my recent study of law school family leave policies and practices found that over two-thirds of
surveyed law schools offer a separate category of paid family leave benefits to their law faculties, at
least informally. Id. However, less than half of the surveyed schools provided leave pursuant to a
formal policy. Id.
94. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS: FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS, 2000 UPDATE § 2.1.2, at 2-7, § 3.5.1, at 3-13 (2000).
95. Id. § 2.2.4, at 2-15 to 2-16.
96. See Kelly, supra note 93, at 101.
97. Id. at 109-12.
98. Id at 105. Higher-income families receive somewhat limited public support for child-care
expenses through the tax system. Id. at 106-07.
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to the male breadwinner/female homemaker ideal and penalizes secondary
wage earners in dual income married families-typically women. 99 At the

same time, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) welfare
program100 and the Earned Income Tax Credit' 0 ' push unmarried, low-

income women with children into the workforce,10 2 often into low-paid,
pink-collar, service-sector jobs.'03
Do the judicial decisions and state policies discussed here contribute to
the glass ceiling, job segregation, and the attachment gap? While there is no
clear answer to this question, studies suggest that this is the case. For
example, although somewhat counterintuitive, having access to parental
leave is associated with taking shorter leaves,'l4 returning to full-time work
sooner after a birth,'0 5 and continuous labor force attachment. 106 Although a

right to an extended family leave (over a year) may discourage women's
employment, women in countries with paid family leave generally have
higher rates of employment.'0

7

Similarly, large cross-national studies show

that generous public child care benefits increase women's labor force

99. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX xv-xvi (1997); Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV.
314, 326 (2003).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 601-619 (2000). TANF replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Id.
§ 601. It is a time-limited, work-focused welfare program aimed at increasing wage work and
marriage among poor women. See id.
101. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
102. See ADAM LOONEY, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM AND
RELATED POLICIES ON SINGLE MOTHERS' WELFARE USE AND EMPLOYMENT (2005), available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Feds/2005/200545/200545pap.pdf; Nada Eissa & Hilary W.
Hoynes, Behavioral Responses to Tares: Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply 13 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11729, 2005), available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/
faculty/hynes/pubications/TaxPolicyEconomy-FinaDrafl.pdf#search=%22nada%2eissa%2beha
vioral%20response%20to%20taxes%22; Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131,
1141-42 (2006).
103. See Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 1249, 1252-54 (1983) (arguing that the "work" typically pushed on women who receive
welfare is low-paid, sex-segregated work consistent with stereotypical gender roles); Rebekah J.
Smith et al., The Miseducation of Welfare Reform: Denying the Promise of Postsecondary
Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211, 219-23 (2003) (critiquing TANF's exclusion of non-vocational
postsecondary education from eligible work activities); Zatz, supra note 102, at 1151 (describing
restrictive "work-first" programs in many states, implemented pursuant to TANF, which prioritize
immediate labor force attachment over long-term employability enhancement for welfare recipients).
104. See Sandra L. Hofferth & Sally C. Curtin, ParentalLeave Statutes and Maternal Return to
Work After Childbirth in the United States, 33 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 73, 100 (2006).
105. Id.
106. See Kelly, supra note 93, at 116.
107. Id. Note that other variables may be driving the negative association of family leaves over a
year and women's labor force participation. See id.
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participation.' 08 Finally, many empirical studies of labor market behavior
have found that workers respond to changes in their after-tax wage rates,
choosing to work less when their take-home wage rate falls.' 09 American

tax and welfare policy explicitly rely on this rational economic behavior to
discourage privileged married women from working and to push low-income
unmarried women into the labor force, often into low-paid, pink-collar jobs.
Again, it is hard to square private, individualized accident and opt-out
explanations for women's secondary status in the workforce with these
larger state-sponsored pressures that influence women's decisions about

family and work.
I am not suggesting here that women have no agency with regard to

their decisions about wage work. Legal feminism has taught us in the past
decade that we should resist theories that rest on an assumption of false
consciousness. " 0 There are myriad and complex ways women exercise their
agency, however limited or distorted by gender subordination. "' Indeed, as
I have explored elsewhere, upon recognition that women have complex,
intersecting identities, behaviors or practices that previously appeared to be

primarily the product of gender subordination may actually represent
political resistance to other axes of oppression."12 For example, some black

women's decisions to spend more time with their families may be
understood, at least in part, as a form of resistance to racism as much as
acquiescence to traditional gender norms.

3

The state has heavily regulated

black women's sexuality, reproduction, family caregiving work, and wage
work from slavery to the present.' 14 Black women have resisted and sought
refuge from this discrimination in part through family and community
relationships. 15 Does this mean women of color are "opting out" of the
workforce? Or are they simply responding to discrimination in both their
work and family lives in ways that preserve their dignity and
communities?" 6
Again, the accident and opt-out constructs appear

108. Id. at 116.
109. See, e.g., Nada Eissa, Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Reform Act of
1986 As a Natural Experiment (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5023, 1995)
(finding evidence that the labor supply of wives in upper-income families is highly sensitive to aftertax wages); Siv Gustafsson, Separate Taxation and Married Women 's Labor Supply: A Comparison
of West Germany and Sweden, 5 J. POP. ECON. 61, 82 (1992) (finding, in an international
comparison of the labor supply of wives under joint and individual taxation, that joint taxation
reduces the participation of women in the labor force).
110. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence,8 SIGNs 635, 637-38 n.5 (1983) (arguing that women's subjective experience is part
of the epistemological dilemma posed by male dominance).
Ill. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304 passim (1995).
112. See Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving,33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (2005).
113. Id. at 12-26.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id. at21-22,25-27.
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incoherent once we take account of larger structural factors that influence
individual decisions, such as discrimination. Falling somewhere between
the totalizing theories of false consciousness and unfettered choice, these
more complex understandings of women's choices simply recognize that we
all exercise our agency under conditions of constraint. 117
A final common explanation for women's secondary status in the
workforce is the "time lag" theory. Here is an example from legal academia:
Assistant professors make up only 11% of all tenure-track or tenured law
teachers and associate professors only 17%.118 Given the small size of this
pool, even if we assume that all women presently in the pipeline will receive
tenure, the percentage of female full professors would increase from 25% to
only 31%.119 At this rate, assuming a five-year tenure track, the percentage
of women full professors would not reflect their relative presence among law
school graduates nationally until the year 2024120 and their relative presence
in the student bodies of "producer schools"' 21 until23 2023.122 Similar
projections exist for medicine, business, and law firms. 1
One way of conceptualizing time-lag is as a problem exogenous to the
workplace. Why should law schools, or employers more generally, be
responsible for the effects of past discrimination? This question forms the
basis for many of the Supreme Court's decisions on affirmative action and

117.

See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY

passim (2004); Abrams, supranote Ill, passim.
118. See WHITE, supra note 8, at 3 tbl.IA (showing 4,535 full professors, 1,096 associate
professors, and 659 assistant professors in 2004-05).
119. See id.
at 3 tbl.IA, 6 tbl.2A. These percentages were calculated by dividing the total number
of tenured or tenure-track professors at the full, associate, and assistant professor levels in 2004-05
reported in table IA (6,290) by the total number of female full professors that would exist if all of
the female assistant and associate professors in 2004-05 reported in table 2A (794) were promoted to
full professor (1,927). Id. A similar analysis by Richard Neumann using 2002-03 AALS data
corroborates these findings. See Neumann, supra note 13, at 427 (showing an increase in female full
professors from 23% to only 29% if all the associate and assistant professors in 2002-03 were
promoted to full professor).
120. See ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission, Degrees Awarded 1981-2004,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/degrees.html (showing that from 2000 to 2004, women
earned 48.2% of the J.D. degrees awarded).
121. Producer schools are schools whose graduates historically have made up a large proportion
of law faculties. See Neumann, supra note 13, at 436.
122.

See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA/LSAC

OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS ch. 12 (2001-2005) (showing that women
constituted 47.2% of enrolled students at the producer schools from 2000 to 2004). This percentage
was calculated by averaging the relevant data for the producer schools in the 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, and 2005 editions. Id. This number may overstate the percentage of women law graduates at
the producer schools, because enrollment statistics do not account for differential attrition rates
between male and female law students. Graduation statistics broken down by sex are not readily
available on a school-by-school basis.
123. See, e.g., 2005 CATALYST CENSUS, supra note 19, at 6; VALIAN, supranote 18, at 186-216.
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disparate impact in the employment context since the 1980s.

124

We also see

it in much law and economic scholarship about the workplace. 125 There are
two reasons to be suspicious of this way of thinking about the problem.
First, cohort studies demonstrate that the pipeline is leaky. That is, time
does not fully explain the underrepresentation of equally qualified women in
jobs with the highest status, reward, and influence. 26 Therefore, some part
of the glass ceiling is likely the product of ongoing,present discrimination.
Second, even if women's underrepresentation at the top of virtually every

profession is partly a product of their relatively recent entrance, those at the
top of the workplace are the beneficiaries of a past system of de jure

discrimination. 127 As such, they should take some responsibility for
reversing its effects. This will require not just non-discrimination at the
entry level, which appears to be occurring for the most part in many
professions,1 28 but a serious commitment to affirmative action. Without that

commitment, progress toward a truly inclusive workplace is likely to remain
slow. Furthermore, a failure of commitment in this area is itself a form of
discrimination. In sum, advocates and theorists committed to workplace
equality must contest the myth that those who hold positions of greatest
reward, status, and influence in the workplace got there by merit alone.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is not my intention to deny the agency of individual women and men.

We all make decisions for complex reasons, and every decision can fairly be
understood as personal. Similarly, all workers are not equally qualified or
124. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring a highly-focused
showing that particular employment practices caused disparate impact under Title VII and finding
that evidence of severe racial segregation inside an employer's workforce was not enough to make
out a prima facie case); Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42
(1987) (requiring, inter alia, evidence of a significantly imbalanced workforce before a private
employer may adopt an affirmative action plan). But cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325
(2003) (endorsing diversity as a constitutional justification for affirmative action in the public
educational setting).
125. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 273 (1992); Becker, supra note 43, at 55; Wax, supra note 47.
126. See VALIAN, supra note 18, at 200-03 (reviewing studies showing that women lawyers'
youth does not fully account for their significantly lower promotion rates to partner); Ash et al.,
supra note 18, at 209 ("Although ample numbers of women have entered academic medicine for at
least the past 2 decades, the representation of women among full professors was only slightly higher
in 1998 than in 1978 .... "); Fairfax, supra note 19, at 580 (reporting that women hold only about
thirteen percent of available board seats at Fortune 500 corporations despite the fact that they have
made up an increasingly larger portion of the workforce for decades); Kaplan et al., supra note 18, at
1282 (reporting that the proportion of women in the senior ranks of academic medicine has remained
relatively constant over the past decade, despite an increase in the proportion of applicants to
medical school who are women and an increase in the representation of women among entry-level
faculty over the same period).
127. See Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Or, Do You Really Want
to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 1223-27 (1991).
128. See VALIAN, supra note 18, at 187-216.
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motivated to serve at the top of their profession. My main point is that
discrimination is a significant contributing factor to women's secondary
status in the workplace. The methodology I have used to arrive at this
conclusion falls squarely within our legal tradition. There are many openended tests within law. For example, family law courts use the "totality of
the circumstances" test to determine children's best interests. In civil
litigation, fact-finders determine liability based on the "preponderance of the
evidence." But this requires us to step back and look at all of the evidence.
The accident, opt-out, and time-lag theories are not neutral, empirical
descriptions of the world. They are stories that incorporate political and
moral judgments about the proper relationship of individuals to the larger
society. They fundamentally embrace the liberal and neoliberal assumption
that individuals are independent, autonomous, unencumbered beings who
are owed little from employers or the state. These stories hide the
significant role of powerful institutions such as
employers, the state, and the
29
family in women's secondary status at work. 1
The discrimination story I have sought to tell here is somewhat more
complex than the simple story of personal choice, for it relies on recent,
sophisticated research on how structural features of workplaces and
governments produce gender inequality in the labor force. The
discrimination story I have presented here is also more complex than the
accident and opt-out accounts of women's secondary status at work, because
it takes account of how traditional gender bias interacts with and reinforces
work/family conflict. These more subtle understandings of workplace
inequality should not deter us from keeping discrimination theory front and
center in the discourse over sex discrimination, including the discourse over
work/family conflict. If we are to make any headway in achieving a more
egalitarian workplace, we need to move away from conceptualizations of the
glass ceiling, pink ghetto, and attachment gap as the personal problems of
individual employees toward seeing them as structural discrimination
problems of employers and society.

129. Social psychologists studying discrimination call this system justification.
"[S]ystem
justification theory describes how people create beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) that support the status quo,
which allows them to see the social system in which they live as fair and legitimate." Cuddy et al.,
supra note 42, at 706. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES
ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGOUP RELATIONS (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
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